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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.-: 1 AH: UF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
ROBERT STEVEN SMITH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Case No. 19053 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant, Robert Steven Smith, was charged by 
information with Attempted Robbery, a third degree felony, and 
Attempted Burglary, a third degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann.§§ 76-4-101, 76-6-301, and 76-6-202 (1953 as 
amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Appellant was found guilty of Attempted Robbery, a 
third degree felony, and Attempted Burglary, a third degree 
felony, in a jury trial held January 13, 17, and 19, 1983, in 
the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake county, 
State of Utah, the Honorable David B. Dee presiding. On 
te>l,ruary 1, 1983, appellant was sentenced to not more than 
y<0ctrs at the Utah State Prison to be served concurrently 
»'!; 1 1 t,e terms he was already serving. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks an order of this Court affirming 
lhe Jurlq,'mPnt and sentence of the trial court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant, Robert Steven Smith, wns incarcerate<1 ,11 
the Utah State Prison and was residing in a half-way hous,, "" 
work release status (R. 142). On October 15, 1981 appellant 
was arrested by South Salt Lake City police officers for 
violation of his parole and suspicion of being involved in a 
criminal activity (R. 142, 1173-1174). Co-defendant Wayne 
Sterling Pearson and two juveniles, Brian Scott Moss and 
Gilbert Anthony Sisneros, were also taken into custody on that 
date. Following their arrest Mr. Moss and Mr. Sisneros gave 
police statements which, along with evidence produced from an 
investigatory search of appellant's automobile (R. 1176-1181), 
were sufficient to establish appellant's involvement in a 
scheme to burglarize and rob the home of Myra E. Kuhre (R. 
140, 598-607, 984, 9%-998). 
On October 15, 1981, as a result of appellant's 
association with fellow half-way house resident Pearson in an 
area not related to appellant's work release, as well as his 
suspected criminal activity, appellant was returned to the 
Utah State Prison. Appellant's work release status was 
revoked and his January 1982 parole release date was rescinded 
by the Utah Board of Pardons on the basis of the above parole 
violations (R. 142-143). 
From the October JS, 1981 arrest for parole 
violation until March or April l9R2, police conducted a 
follow-up investigation to obtain evidence to corroborate 
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trw 
witnesses' statements concerning the robbery scheme (R. 140). 
f',il ice officers investigating the case considered this case 
,,,J,1tPrl to other criminal activity in the area and realized 
t 11at a discrete investigation was essential to avoid 
erKlan<Jering successful prosecution of other potential 
defendants (R. 141). For this reason the investigation 
crJnt inued beyond April 1982 and charges for attempted robbery 
and burglary were not filed against appellant until September 
7, 1982. 
At trial, appellant produced no evidence that the 
delay in filing the information for attempted robbery and 
burglary resulted in any prejudice to his defense, nor did he 
make any showing that the de lay was intentionally ca used by 
the prosecutor to gain a tactical advantage over appellant (R. 
14 3) • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL 
IS INAPPLICABLE TO THE ELEVEN MONTH DELAY 
BETWEEN APPELLANT'S ARREST FOR PAROLE 
VIOLATION AND THE DATE FORMAL CHARGES FOR 
ATTEMPTED ROBBERY AND ATTEMPTED BURGLARY 
WERE MADE AGAINST HIM. 
A. THE SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO SPEEDY 
TRIAL MAY NOT BE INVOKED UNTIL A 
PERSON IS FORMALLY "ACCUSED" IN THE 
COURSE OF CRIMINAL PROSECUTION. 
Appellant claims that the delay of approximately 
munths between appellant's arrest for parole violation 
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and the date formal charges for attempted robhery and burglar', 
were filed against him violated his sixth Amendment right tr,, 
speedy trial. This contention is without merit. The right l, 
a speedy trial is guaranteed by the sixth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution and by Article I, Section 12 of the 
Utah Constitution. The Sixth Amendment provides that "[i]n 
all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right 
to a speedy and public trial. Article I, Sect ion 12 
provides that "[i]n criminal prosecution, the accused shall 
have the right to • • a speedy trial by an impartial jury of 
the County or District in which the offense is alleged to have 
been committed •• The Sixth Amendment and Article I, 
Section 12 guarantees of a speedy trial afford important 
protections against undue and oppressive incarceration prior 
to trial, minimize anxiety and concern which accompany public 
accusation, and limit the possibility of impaired defense due 
to long delay between accusation and trial. 
States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). 
See United 
The right to a speedy trial, however, may not 
invoked against every delay between accusation and trial. The 
Ewell court, after enumerating the reasons for speedy trial, 
continued by qualifying the right as one relative to the 
circumstances of each particular case. The court stated that 
some delays are necessary to ensure adequate prosecution, and 
a defendant's right to a speedy trial "does not preclude the 
right of public justice." United States v. Ewell, 383 u .s. 
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The constitutional right to speedy trial does not 
"tt"' h u11til a person has been "accused" of criminal activity. 
Wt'J ·1e ;ippel lant in the case at bar was arrested on October 15, 
lQHl fnr parole violation, he was not formally "accused" of 
attempted robbery and burglary until September 7, 1982. Both 
tne constitutional language as well as the language in the 
Ewell opinion refer to the speedy trial right of the 
t•accused." In United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) 
the Supreme Court expressly adopted this limitation, stating 
that "the Six th Amendment speedy trial provision has no 
application until the putative defendant in some way becomes 
an 'accused 1 • • On its face, the protection of the 
Amendment is activated only when a criminal prosecution has 
hegun anci extends only to those persons who have been 
'accused' in the course of that prosecution." united States 
v. Marion, 404 U.S. at 313. The Marion court also expounded 
on the meaning of "accused." The court stated that the speedy 
trial provisions of the Sixth Amendment are engaged upon: 
either a formal indictment or information 
nr else the actual restraints imposed by 
arrest and holding to answer a criminal 
charge .... 
Invocation of the speedy trial provision 
thus need not await indictment, 
information, or other formal charge. But 
we decline to extend the reach of the 
amendment to the period prior to arrest. 
lint i l this event occurs, a citizen suffers 
n'' restraints on his liberty and is not 
Lhe subject of public accusation. 
404 U.S. at 320-321. 
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Utah cases have also consistently held that no 
speedy trial right exists until a prosecution has teen 
initiated by a formal indictment or information. See 
generally State v. Renzo, 21 Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968); 
State v. Belcher, 25 Utah 2d 37, 475 P.2d 60 (1970). In other 
words, until a defendant is formally accused by indictment, 
information, or arrest in the course of criminal prosecution, 
the Speedy Trial Clause is irrelevant as to that crime. 
Appellant's octoter 15, 1982 arrest was related to his parole 
violation, and was not in the course of criminal prosecution 
for attempted robbery and burglary. 
Many of the cases cited in appellant's brief are 
distinguishable on this point. In both Klopfer v. North 
Carolina, 386 u.s. 213 (1967) and People v. Prosser, 309 N.Y. 
353, 130 N.E.2d 891 (1955), the delay complained of occurred 
between the indictment and trial. Thus, the defendant in each 
case stood accused of the crime and was entitled to the Sixth 
Amendment speedy trial right. In State v. Lozano, 23 Utah 2d 
312, 462 P.2d 710 (1969), Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (19721 
and Dillingham v. United States, 423 U.S. 64 (1975), also 
relied upon by appellant, the defendants had been arrested 
pursuant to criminal prosecution, and thus stood accused of 
criminal conduct. 
B. APPELLANT WAS NOT "ACCUSED" OF THE 
PRESENT CHARGES UNTIL SEPTEMRER 7, 1982; 
THUS, THE RIGHT TO SPEEDY TRIAL DID NOT 
ATTACH UNTIL THAT DATE. 
In the present case, the Speedy Trial Clause is 
as to appellant's confinement for parole violation 
"'nor to the information which was filed September 7, 1982 for 
attempted robtery and burglary (R. 143). Appellant was not 
formally "accused" of the present charges (attempted robbery 
and attempted burglary) neither by indictment, nor 
information, nor arrest, nor even by confinement until 
Septemter 7, 1982. Rather, appellant's arrest on Octoter 15, 
1981 and subsequent return to the Utah State Prison was a 
result of appellant's violation of his parole status and not 
related to the September 7, 1982 charges of attempted robbery 
and burglary. Prior to his arrest, appellant was incarcerated 
at the Utah State Prison pursuant to an unrelated conviction 
and was living at a half-way house on work release status (R. 
142). on October 15, 1981, South Salt Lake City police 
officers arrested appellant based on his being at a place not 
related to his work release, his unauthorized association with 
another half-way house resident, and his being suspected of 
criminal activity -- all violations of appellant's conditions 
of parole (R. 142-143). 
The Utah Supreme Court has upheld the Utah Board of 
Pardons' authority to assign conditions of parole to parolees 
has allowed police officers to arrest and reimprison 
"l•ec<' 0 ·rn hased on violation of his conditions of parole. See 
5tate v. Kent, Utah, 665 P.2d 1317 (1983) (The Court 
J,,L,,ur ized arrest based on defendant's violation of his parole 
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by association with known felons); State v. Bullock, tltah, ',», 
P.2d 777 (1979) (Parolee has limiterl liberty which may be 
cancelled); Vriege v. Turner, 18 Utah 2d 213, 419 P.2rl 769 
(1966) (Upheld the Board of Pardons' right to attach 
conditions of parole and authorities' right to arrest and 
reimprison a person for violating such conditions). 
This Court, in ward v. Smith, Utah, 573 P.2d 781 
(1978), discussed in detail the role of the Board of Pardons 
with respect to granting parole: 
The Board of Pardons is created by the 
constitution and its exclusive powers are 
implemented by statute. It has plenary 
authority to conditionally release 
prisoners on parole. Parole is a 
conditional release, the condition t:eing 
that the prisoner make good or be returned 
to serve his unexpired time (U.C.A. 
77-62-l(b)(l953)). It is a privilege, an 
act of grace as distinguished from a 
right. Parole is not absolute liberty as 
all law-abiding citizens enjoy, but only 
conrlitional lit:erty dependant upon 
compliance with parole restrictions. The 
parolee remains in legal custody until 
such time as his sentence is terminated. 
Parole revocation is an administrative 
proceeding and not a criminal prosecuticn. 
[see Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 u.s. 471 
(T972)]. It stems from a clear violation 
of the rules and regulations imposed as a 
condition of parole, 
ward v. Smith, 573 P.2d at 782 (emphasis added). 
Utah Code Ann. 77-62-17 as amended), which provides 
that parole revocation can occur without any violation of the 
criminal law. 
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In the present case, during the entire period from 
1he- rict"rer 15, 1981 arrest for parole violation to the 
';Pf•tPmhPr "I, 1982 charges for attempted robtery and burglary, 
0 pµellant was incarcerated pursuant to a lawful commitment on 
a previous charge. This confinement did not commence criminal 
prusecution and thereby activate the speedy trial guarantee, 
but rather appellant's arrest was a result of his parole 
revocation -- an administrative proceeding which would have 
resulted regardless of appellant's explanation for teing in an 
unauthorized area in the company of another half-way house 
resident. such an administrative proceeding is insufficient 
to invoke the Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. 
C. THE PRE-ACCUSATION DELAY WAS FOR 
INVESTIGATIVE REASONS AND DID NOT RESULT 
IN VIOLATION OF APPELLANT'S DUE PROCESS 
RIGHT. 
In determining whether an appellant's speedy trial 
right has been violated, the court will consider not only the 
of time from arrest to indictment and indictment to 
trial, hut also any delay which occurs prior to the arrest. 
Anrl while no Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial arises 
ur1t1l formal charges are pending, any unnecessary "delay prior 
tr arr est or indictment may give rise to a due process claim 
\,,, tr1e Fifth Amendment." United States v. MacDonald, 456 
1 ( 1982) (citation omitted). See also united States 
411 u.s. 783, 788-789 (1977). The Due Process 
' '· .J'rc.;e, r1uwever, does not allow the courts complete discretion 
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to decide when an indictment should be sought or when an 
arrest should be made. The court's judgment in this regard 
should not be substituted for that of the attorney. 
to the United States Supreme court: 
It requires no extended argument to 
establish that prosecutors do not deviate 
from "fundamental conceptions of justice" 
when they defer seeking indictments until 
they have prol:Bble cause to believe an 
accused is guilty . It should be 
equally o bJ ious that prosecutors are under 
no duty to file charges as soon as 
protable cause exists but before they are 
satisfied they will be able to establish 
the suspect's guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. * * * 
Penalizing prosecutors who defer actions 
for [investigative delay] would 
subordinate the goal of "orderly 
expedition" to that of "mere speed," 
Smith v. United States, 360 U.S. 1, 10 
(1959). This the Due Process Clause does 
not require. we therefore hold that to 
prosecute a defendant following 
investigative delay does not deprive him 
of due process, even if his defense might 
have been somewhat prejudiced by the lapse 
of time. 
Accord 1 W' 
United States v. Lovasco, 431 u.s. at 790-791, 795-796. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has construed 
United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971) as establishing a 
two-pronged due process test against which to measure 
pre-accusation delay. In order for a defendant to 
successfully maintain a due process claim he must show: (1) 
"actual prejudice resulting from the pre indictment delay," 
(2) "that the delay was purposefully designed to gain 
tactical advantage or to harass the defendants." 
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v. Revada, 574 F.2d 1047, 1048 (10th Cir. 1978) quoting 
l'n1t0d States v. Beitscher, 467 F.2d 269, 272 (10th Cir. 
The United States Supreme Court in Lovasco confirmed 
the Tenth Circuit's interpretation by stating that "the due 
process inquiry must consider the reasons for the delay as 
wel 1 as the prejudice to the accused." United States v. 
431 U.S. at 790. Likewise, this Court also 
enunciated the same due process test in State v. Archuletta, 
Utah, 577 P.2d 547 (1978). In Archuletta this Court 
rero]ni zed the accused's right to a prompt trial, but also 
stressed that "unless there is some intentional delay of an 
oppressive character, which results in prejudice to the 
defendant, the processes of justice should not be wholly 
defeated [by the delay]." State v. Archuletta, 577 P.2d at 
548-S49. 
Thus in order to sustain a due process claim, 
appPllant must show that preindictment delay caused 
prejudice to his right to a fair trial and that 
the delay was an intentional device by the prosecutor to gain 
some tactical advantage over the accused. The trial court 
cuiwlulie<i that appellant had met neither requirement (R. 143). 
/\ppel lant argues that he was prejudiced due to his 
,,-,_,ration. However, as already discussed, appellant's 
"-'' t,, prison was based upon violations of the conditions 
t 1 « ri.,lf-way house status. Appellant has made no showing of 
"" t11sL111u=, nor is there any, where the delay prior to filing 
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charges caused harm to appellant or his case. Parole is not 
matter of right, but is a discretionary function of the pa 1 , 
board. Appellant has made ahsolutely no showing that the 
delay in filing charges caused the delay of the gratuitous 
parole date. Nor is a claim of prejudice based upon passarJe 
of time sufficient. In United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 
783, 796 ( 1977) the court held that investigative delay would 
not give rise to a due process claim even if the defense 
might have teen somewhat prejudiced. The defendant 
was prejudiced by the death of two witnesses, yet no due 
process action would lie. In the case at bar, appellant 
claims that the State's witnesses were unable to consistently 
remember the events of which they testified. The 
inconsistencies, however, were not due to memory failure, but 
rather to fabricated stories told by the two young men (R. 
653-654, 664, 669-671, 1082-1085). Nevertheless, even if the 
inconsistencies were due to memory failure, the lapse of time 
and its impact on memories will always be present in any 
delay. See United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 321-322 
(1971). llhere there is no intention of delay for that 
purpose, the mere passage of time is insufficient to establish 
substantial prejudice. 
Appellant has also failed to show an intentional 
delay by the State to gain a tactical advantage. Appellant 
implicitly makes a due process claim founded upon delay 
tetween the octot:er 15, 1981 arrest for parole violation atr'1 
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tli•· c,q,temt>cr 7, 1982 filing of the information for attempted 
.1 '' l\' alld riurglary. Appellant assumes that the information 
I I 11 .. ve °"en filed on the earlier date, but has made no 
lll•J to the effect but for his conjecture in hindsight. In 
fact, the rlelay was necessary to allow police investigators 
erlequate time to uncover evidence which would support the 
'h0r,JeS of attempted robbery and attempted burglary. The 
trial court found that (1) the investigation of this crime 
was part of a larger investigation involving other potential 
rlefenda nts; ( 2) early disclosure of the present charge might 
hav" Jeopanhzed the larger investigation; and (3) the crime 
appellant was involved in was still under investigation (R. 
140-141). As previously discussed, and supported by United 
States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. at 790-791, 795-796, investigative 
rlelays alone are not violative of due process considerations, 
a11d such delays are not to be regarded as an attempt to gain a 
tart ical erlge over the accused. 
D. THE TIME PERIOD OF DELAY WAS 
SUBSTANTIALLY LESS THAN WHAT IS PERMITTED 
BY THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
This Court should also note that the period of delay 
t,ef,,re commencing prosecution of the appellant was 
1ally less than that permitted by the statute of 
'"nlt"Jtlr•n°;, which for Aggravated Robbery and Burglary is four 
11t,,h Code Ann.<; 76-1-302 (1953 as amended). 
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right 
to a speedy trial. This constitutional right does not attaci 
until a person has teen "accused" of criminal activity. A 
person tecomes "accused" either by the filing of an 
information or indictment or by arrest in connection with a 
criminal prosecution. Appellant, however, was not "accused" 
of the present charge until shortly before his trial. 
Although appellant was arrested on October 15, 1981, eleven 
months prior to his trial on charges of attempted robtery anrl 
burglary, that Octoter arrest was an administrative proceedin: 
pursuant to appellant's violation of his parole conditions as 
it related to a previous and unrelated conviction. 
Appellant's pre-trial incarceration at the Utah State Prison 
was not in connect ion with the charges of the crimes which 
pertain to this appeal. 
Appellant had been convicted of previous charges and 
was serving time at a half-way house on work release status 
from the Utah State Prison. On October 15, 1981 appellant 
violated the conditions of his parole and was consequently 
returned to the Prison. Violation of parole by appellant was 
sufficient basis upon which to revoke his parole and return 
him to the Utah state Prison to serve the remainder of his 
previous sentence. 
Moreover, appellant is unable to show that the deJc, 
in filing charges ayainst him deprived appellant of his ri9 1'' 
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t" due process of law. The delay was neither prejudicial to 
;'i•['Pl lant 's defense nor was it an intentional delay by the 
lnU U> qain a tactical advantage. Rather, the delay was 
essential to allow adequate investigation of this case as well 
as inquiry into possible related criminal cases. Based upon 
the foregoing, the judgment and sentence of the trial court 
s ho u 1 d l::e af firmed . 
1984, 
RESPECTFULLY subnitted this day of August, 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
- /) •J/ </ 
"7[: "z. (./-<... v _> \:::::::z &rvi.-::J '."" fct (_ 
J. STEPHEN MIKITA /; / 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and exact copy 
of the foregoing Brief, postage prepaid, to Thomas J. 
McCor·m ic k, 
tare City, 
attorney for appellant, 333 South Second East, 
,-...J..-L 
Utah R4111, this Y day of August, 1984. __.,..._ 
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